



History of military intelligence

The field of military intelligence under military conditions has been organized, controlled and used variously in every individual country. It is usually divided in two basic kinds of activities; i.e. intelligence or offensive intelligence, and defensive or counter-intelligence. At the same time, the essence in this case is not what names of individual military intelligence sections are and in which organization structure they have been operating, the essence is always the area of activities. Every intelligence service, including the military one, can represent information service without executive power, up to services with executive power, permission to arrest and interrogate. They differ in range of activities, mostly in connection with the facts the country is democratic or totalitarian, if and how much risks and threats of military assault are real in individual countries and, on the contrary, ambitions to expand. It depends also up to traditions, importance of the security bodies in the social system of the country and their position in the social value system.

Under Czechoslovak and later Czech conditions, even military intelligence reflected social system and conditions and, in the face of these, it went through a series of organization forms, had different aims and ways to gain them. Since the beginning of development of the military intelligence, through its operations in the First Republic conditions of the time before the Munich Pact of 1938, the Second Republic, during the Second World War, shortly after the WWII during the fight of democratic and communist powers for the power in the post-war republic, through its operation in the structures of communist National Defense Ministries and Interior Ministries, up to its present form given by the legislation after 1990, it always have had reflected politic requests and interests.

Period of the First Republic (October 28, 1918 - September 29, 1938)

Since the beginning of establishment, the Czechoslovak Republic had to deal with a series of problems of domestic character, which were, represented mainly by activities of numerous national minorities, which lived within the borders. The German minority expressed itself the most strongly in historical lands of Bohemia and Moravia and Hungarian minority did in Slovakia.

In October 28, 1918, the independent Czechoslovak Republic was established. In October 29, proclamations of German deputies to establish the "Deutschböhmen" in northern Bohemia with the center in Liberec and, next day, establishment of the "Sudetenland" in the territory of Moravia and Silesia with the center in Opava, occurred in Vienna. In November 2, the German deputies from the southern Moravia declared establishment of the "Deutschsüdmähren" with the center in Znojmo and Germans of the Bohemian Forest established the "Böhmenwaldgau" with the center in Prachatice. It resulted in the situation when all these declared provinces with the majority of German inhabitants wanted to join Germany or Austria. Since no positive reaction to the efforts was in Germany due to chaotic internal situation, these self-appointed representatives of the German minority decided to annex the four provinces to Austria. However, these irredentist tendencies had no real chance to be successful and they were liquidated just by military unit appearance in these parts of the new republic a month and a half later.

A similar situation occurred in Slovakia, when the government of the new Hungary did not want to accept an annex of Slovakia and the Carpathian Russia to Czechoslovakia. This opinion corresponded to opinions of the Hungarian minority in the area of the Czechoslovak Republic (CSR). However, Hungarian separatist efforts had never grown as



the German one did, because Hungary did not have the international-political and military field power to implement its intentions.

According to reaction of the Czechoslovak government, German nationalists went underground straight in the first days of the republic. They had been establishing associations and organizations, which set themselves large aims leading to fulfil the above mentioned intentions. An illegal resistance group the "Deutscher Mitterstandverband" was established around deputy in the National Assembly Dr. Alois Baeran. In 1919, a center for German illegal resistance movement in Czechoslovakia the "Hilfsverein für Deutschböhmen" was established in Vienna.

To sketch in the situation, we have to add that a German consul in Prague Baron Gabsattel was expelled from Czechoslovakia because of espionage at the beginning of 1919. This espionage was a grave signal to the Czechoslovak Administration about real intents of the neighboring country in the period shortly after the war and establishment of diplomatic relations with Germany. According to above-mentioned facts, the Headquarters of the Czechoslovak Army proceeded to development of military intelligence, which comprised of the 2nd Department (intelligence) of the General Staff, in 1919 after necessary preparations.

During first several years, the 2nd Department dealt mainly with lack of personnel since the head of the Military Intelligence in the Austro-Hungarian Army was Brigadier Max Ronge in the First World War. He was against placing officers of the Czech nationality in the intelligence service of the Monarchy, especially in higher military headquarters. However, Major of the General Staff Haužvic and Major of the General Staff Pavel operated in the intelligence structures of the Austro-Hungarian Army. Based on their experience, the Czechoslovak National Defense Ministry appointed Major Čeněk Haužvic in the post of Chief of the 2nd Department of the Main Staff. Major Pavel left to work in the structures of the State Department. However, he put together his experience in the Intelligence Service to be used by the 2nd Department. The deputy of the Chief of the 2nd Department was Major of Italian legion Mojmír Soukup. Under his control, the Department started investigation of intelligence information from the 1st World War and first intelligence courses begun. In the courses, mainly French officers lectured. The 2nd Department was then built primarily on the base of experience and with respect to the system of the French organization.

In the process of time, a younger generation of officers was coming to the posts in the Military Intelligence. These were educated in the Military Academy and War College. Even the level of intelligence activities led by the 2nd Department gradually increased. In 1930, it surpassed often the countries with a long-term intelligence tradition as a result of its offensive, defensive and study sections. The Military Intelligence Service represented the most efficient part within the Czechoslovak security system.

Focus of offensive and defensive activities of the Military Intelligence Service originated in potential military threats and task of the Czechoslovak Army. It had to provide security of the country, which was surrounded by the countries, which did not favor us, except a small part of a state border with Romania in the east. As we mentioned above, Germany, Hungary and partly even Poland laid claim to territories and took exception to policy towards the Czechoslovak Republic. Their national minorities in Czechoslovakia represented a fertile base for espionage and sabotage activities both in the peace time and time of increased alert conditions in the country and in the state of war. Austria represented smaller threat than above-mentioned countries; however, it was monitored



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

by the Intelligence since 20's with regard to a traditional risk of restoration of the Hapsburg Monarchy that originated more in philosophic fears than in real threats.

Two groups were supporting members of the Military Intelligence. Search group, which is divided into offensive and defensive sections, and plan and study group (at present of information and analytic character). The main role of the offensive section of the search group was to gain external information on military threats. The subject of its interest were especially military, political and economic information, special significance represented information on military power of enemies, their training, organization and arms, replenish, supply, and especially mobilization plans. Of extra importance in activities of the offensive section was information on war industry, arms development, military unit and various military facilities dislocation, airports, stores, command posts, reserves, etc.

The offensive section gained information mostly through the agency networks placed generally abroad. It disposed of agency network used in peacetime and network activated in the higher tension and wartime. It used spies, who had a role of courier, "dead drops" and "tipsters", who predicted persons eligible for cooperation.

Defense section of the Military Intelligence had even a task to prevent infiltration of foreign espionage groups in the Czechoslovak Army and areas important for defense support of the CSR (arms industry, defense facilities development, etc.). It used the same or similar forms and methods of work as the offensive section, however, mainly in the country. Among others, it used institutions of intelligence officers of the peace army in all garrisons and in all levels of command. It checked military men and civilians coming in touch with classified information on activities and interests of hostile secret service. A national defense Act was as a legal base of its activities. According to this act, the service monitored activities of political parties, movements and organizations, which had programs and activities threatening the existence of the CSR.

Defense section tightly cooperated with gendarmerie, all parts of state police and intelligence service of the Interior Ministry. The section had some rights of executive. It carried investigation and monitoring in cases of special importance - for these cases, it had its own law experts.

The first commander of the Military Intelligence was a Brigadier General D.C.L. Vladimír Chalupa. He had a reputation of a person of a good character, deliberate, prudent and kind person, who spent most of the time at social events organized for military attachés and close friends from the corps of generals. General Chalupa was originally a judge in the Ostrava region and he was a friend of T.G. Masaryk.

After pensioning General Chalupa, Colonel of the General Staff Šimon Drgač was appointed to the post of Head of the HQ 2nd Department. His personality was characterized similarly to the one of Gen. Chalupa. During his presence in this post, he outlined modern organization and function form of the Department. This form remained to mid 30's. He defined authority relations among individual groups, embedded internal division of labor and high level of work to the whole Department.

The last head of the 2nd Department before the Munich Pact of 1938 was colonel of the General Staff František Hájek. He had a reputation of a chief, who does not make any mistake, because he is interested more in social events originating in his hierarchy position in the structure in the General Staff than in detail command of the Department.



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

In that time, he relied on his deputy, Colonel of the General Staff František Moravec, who was the head of the search group at the same time. However, we cannot challenge the fact that Military Intelligence started cooperation with representatives of the Soviet intelligence service in Prague in 30's under the leadership of Col. Hajek and he was the first one, who started taking action in continuation of intelligence activities against Germany in case of war.

As the most dangerous, activities of German compulsory service forces being prepared for actions against Czechoslovakia were stated. The German espionage was considered to be the most risky as well, because Germany represented a powerful potential enemy even after its military defeat. Victorious great powers did not arrange passing on the secret archives of German Headquarters, which contained not only plans of postwar taking control over European countries, but also relevant intelligence information on spy networks built before and during the war. Therefore the German intelligence service could continue in activities of the networks, keep on the development and organize the intelligence activities against newly established countries of former Austria-Hungary. Irredentist and counter-state German organizations, movements and associations on the base of nationalistic ideas supported not only financially but also other ways the German Intelligence.

In 1933, the German Intelligence activities towards the CSR increased. That was after Adolph Hitler became a Chancellor of the Third Reich. The Czechoslovak Military Intelligence concluded that the German Intelligence Service prepares a support for actual war action against Czechoslovakia, because of a gradual gaining of Nazi confidential military documents and trapping the intelligence questionnaires and orders to increase irredentist activities. In 1934, the head of the German Military Intelligence became Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, who started reorganization of the service and created centrally controlled spy and defense intelligence, so called Abwehrdienst, according to orders of Hitler and General Keitel. According to Colonel of the General Staff Moravec's assessment, the greatest intelligence pressure at Czechoslovakia from the side of Abwehr started in 1935. The German minority created a great operational situation for the Abwehr activities and espionage for Germany was seen as a point of honor and duty to the spiritual homeland and members of the German minority in Czechoslovakia actually served in espionage with open passion. The current low punishments for espionage were the disadvantage for Czechoslovakia; provisions of national defense Act changed these. Even low resistance of the inhabitants of the Czech nationality to temptation of the German intelligence played into German espionage aggression. Citizens of the Czech nationality often offered their service to Abwehr spontaneously because of financial benefits. Three central offices operated against Czechoslovakia. The central office in Dresden operated against southern and western Bohemia with the special aim at the Pilsner industry region and Wroclaw central office aimed at the Moravian territory. Abwehr used naturally even diplomatic representation of the Third Reich and the German University in Prague.

Hungary started its work against Czechoslovakia as a part of activities against countries of the Little Entente systematically since 1920. Since aims of Hungary and The Third Reich were similar, General Staffs of Hungary and Germany got into contact and on the basis of this the Hungarian-German intelligence cooperation was set, including passing information on aims of the intelligence, which was intensified especially after 1933. Although the system of work of the Hungarian Intelligence was different from the German one, Hungarian and even German services used members of the Hungarian national minority in Slovakia to conduct espionage and to prepare and execute sabotage in the Czechoslovak territory. Especially intelligence of the Hungarian Intelligence central office sited in Vienna, it was easier for Hungarian agents to infiltrate into territory of



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Czechoslovakia than to cross the Czechoslovak-Hungarian border. Especially former officers of the Austrian-Hungarian Army worked for the Central Office that worked in business, industrial and bank organizations, which were in account with Czechoslovakia. The head of the Vienna central office of the Hungarian Intelligence Service was Lieutenant Colonel of the Hungarian Army (of German origin) Reichbauer and activities of the Central Office was legalized as a subdivision of one German export-import company.

On base of above mentioned, strain and power, which the Czechoslovak Counter-Intelligence Service had to deal with in the period and the limited devices it disposed of are clear. For all that, we can tell that Czechoslovak Military Defense Intelligence operated successfully on the whole between the two world wars. It is not possible to know the exact number of cases the service was dealing with, however, cases of high treason and espionage were counted to 2000, which is considerable number. However, even this number represented just a part of realized activities conducted against independent Czechoslovakia in the period of the First Republic.

In connection with activities of the Czechoslovak military intelligence we cannot exclude two medially known and at the same time the most important cases in individual main courses of activities.

The first one is a case of A-54 agent. This man was a member of the Third Reich Paul Thümmel placed in aussenstelle Chemnitz, where he had to be a commander, to fulfill espionage tasks. Thümmel disposed of good political relations originating from his post of foundation member of the SA. He contacted the 2nd Department of the Main Staff of the Czechoslovak Army to offer a cooperation on paper. He did that from the financial reason. On one side the contribution of A-54 to the Czechoslovak intelligence is being overstated, on the other side an opinion that he was a German Abwehr agent of operation camouflage (deceiving and misinformation) occurred. We cannot pursue this case widely, however, we can state that the importance of A-54 for the 2nd Department of the Main Staff was high. For example, he told the Czechoslovak intelligence the exact date and duration of occupation of Czechoslovakia in March 15, 1939, information on the core of the first German offensive in France, German attacking Holland, information of German observers on Finland-German war, preparations and main points of operation against Yugoslavia, German information on Soviet Air Force, reported on stopping the preparations of the German invasion in the Great Britain, etc. For the 2nd Department of the Main Staff, he handed, among others, information on mobilization network against Czechoslovakia, list of receivers of German radio stations, organization of the German Intelligence, provided conclusive espionage material coming from the Third Reich agents from Czechoslovakia to abwehrstelle Dresden, handed a map of Czechoslovakia with places plotted in on our area, where agents of the German espionage network operated. The Department even searched for names of individual agents active against Czechoslovakia. The most effective activity in favor of the Czechoslovak Intelligence was the one he did from spring 1937 to occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1939. However, he worked also in war in cooperation with the Czechoslovak domestic resistance. A-54 was showed up and executed in the Terezín fort by Gestapo.

The greatest success against the Hungarian intelligence activities was a long-term operation lay in gaining information on Hungarian agency network activities in our territory. The information was taken from the correspondence of the Hungarian military attaché General Ujzazy. The Czechoslovak counter-espionage service, on the base of the operation, prepared incriminating materials, which were proposed to general Ujzazy by major Bartík in Budapest after the occupation of Sudeten in autumn of 1938. The materials won general to work for activities in favor of the 2nd Department of the



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Czechoslovak Main Staff. The importance of the step was raised by the fact that General Ujzazy was since his arrival from Czechoslovakia to Budapest in 1938 to his death in 1941 a head of the Hungarian Military Intelligence Service. Since the 2nd Department could not use service of the General after the occupation of Czechoslovakia effectively, it handed him over to the British intelligence service.

The search group of the 2nd Department of the Main Staff controlled also agent A-53, who was a member of the Third Reich Army. He provided information on German plan of sharp and resolute attack of Czechoslovakia in case a war conflict between Germany and France emerges.

An interesting activity of the 2nd Department was establishment of imaginary company - banking institution in Ústí nad Labem, which was used especially for estimating potential agents chosen from the inhabitants of the Third Reich for the Czechoslovak military intelligence. The bank was active during 1934-1936 and had approximately 90 employees. The principle was based on providing loans to the German inhabitants, which preferred the Czechoslovak bank because their demand for money could raise suspicion to security organs in the Third Reich. The debts were mostly from hazard and because of involvements outside marriage, and which had state officials and members of the Third Reich Military Service. Activities of the Cover Company allowed the Czechoslovak intelligence to recruit a number of agents in the Third Reich. The final number of gained agents and estimated persons was in hundreds.

Period of the Second Republic (September 30, 1938 - March 15, 1939)

The period of the so-called "Second Republic", i.e. after withdrawal from Sudetenland up to occupation of the rest of the territory and establishment of the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, is characterized by a deep moral shock of the Czech society and fortifying all separatist currents, being latent or moderate up to that time. Pressed by Germany and by some Czech politicians, LLD Edvard Beneš resigned from his presidency and he flew to London on October 22, 1938. The new government, facing the German threat, was trying to pursue a policy of compromises and appeasement. This also had its results in the army, which had to liquidate all offensive and defensive conceptions focused on Germany. A new concept of activities of the Ministry of National Defense resulted in ban on any operatives' activities directed against Germany. Colonel Moravec made some formal steps, which looked like fulfilling of this prohibition, but in fact he did not give up pursuing anti-German operatives' activities and concealed these activities thoroughly. Analytical activities relating to Germany were no more realized by a study group, but they were carried out by a scouting group itself. During this period, activities against Poland were started and anti-Hungarian operations continued. At that time, the 2nd Section was de facto headed by General Staff Colonel Moravec, because its de jure chief, General Staff Colonel František Hájek had been removed from his post, under the pressure of Germans.

As for military intelligence, the period of the Second Republic is characterized by a loss of political support. Even in the main staff there was not any clear idea of what would happen in the future and how to react upon possible variants of developments.

The 2nd Section gradually obtained items of information about occupying the rest of the territory since early March 1939. The information was gained in an operative way from the cooperating French intelligence service, from phone tapping of the German Reich Embassy in Prague and especially from Agent A-54's messages of March 10 at a



personal meeting with the chief of the offensive section, General Staff Major Emil Strankmüller. In an agreed form via postcards of March 12 and 13, A-54 subsequently confirmed the fact that March 15 was the date of the occupation.

Evaluated items of information were reported to the government, which refused them, and some ministers reacted in a mocking way. On March 11, it was agreed with a representative of the British intelligence service in Prague, Major Gibson, that the Britons would enable some chosen Czechoslovak operatives to leave for London, where they could continue their activities oriented against Germany. At the same time, it was agreed that Colonel Moravec would take 12 members of his group along in accordance with his own choice. The knowledge of Agent A-54 was allegedly a decisive factor for Moravec's choice of the officers. So on March 14, 1939 in the evening, Colonel Moravec left for London accompanied by eleven officers. The officers transported operatives' registers and the most important intelligence materials right by the plane. Further materials were transmitted to Major Gibson so that he could provide their transport via diplomatic mail. The departure of this group can be considered the beginning of the Czechoslovak organized military resistance abroad during the World War II.

Organized Resistance in the West

Because of a temporary lapse of the state and emigration, the intelligence service of the Czechoslovak army lost one of principal preconditions for its independent activity - an own territory and a system of government. These things previously enabled any activity restricted only by state political interests and the limit of its own financial, technical, and territorial means and administrative possibilities. Czechoslovak military intelligence got into a position dependent on other states and their intelligence services. So, it conducted its operations from their territories or interest areas. It was a fundamental, long-term, and insolvable problem. Its unfavorable impacts could be only softened, restricted, and corrected, but not completely removed or eliminated.

In addition to the center of the abroad resistance movement in London, the Paris Administration of the Czechoslovak Army Committee and Military Board was established in the summer and then mainly since September 1939. The Intelligence Headquarters in Paris, which not many persons were working for, was operating from May 1, 1939 to June 1940. The residence was in a rented villa at 13, Victor Hugo Avenue. It was a relatively independent component. It was directly subordinated neither to the military administration nor to the command of Czechoslovak troops in France, and it represented an autonomous component of the London intelligence group.

The task of the Paris group was to carry out counter-espionage and to protect the Czechoslovak resistance organizations and military as well as political institutions against German infiltration and other negative influences. However, more real threats occurred not so much in connection with German intelligence activities, but more or less in connection with the internal relations within the Czechoslovak resistance movement. The intelligence defense operated under difficult conditions in a foreign territory without necessary state administration and executive, and it used to be dependent on testimonials and references of army members only. At the same time, the defense component was under a strong pressure of the French police and counter-intelligence, which forced the Czechoslovak persons to take measures, which were not beneficial to interests of the Czechoslovak resistance movement.



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

The greatest problem proved to be a political disunity of members of the 1st Czechoslovak Division. Even a numerous aviation group operated in France. However, it was fragmented within the structure of the French air force in order to fulfil tasks and so political problems did not arise. Various political platforms were the consequence of the composition of the 1st Czechoslovak Division in France, consisting of three social-political and national groups, which reflected very different spectra of the former first-republican society.

The first group, which was the most appropriate for carrying out military activities, was represented by Czechoslovak citizens who emigrated from the Protectorate with the primary aim to take part in the military resistance against the German occupation and who joined the Czechoslovak army abroad, or it was represented by those who were confronted by the war during their stay abroad, refused return to their occupied home country, and contacted the Czechoslovak troops abroad. Volunteers were arriving through Poland, the foreign legion, later from Yugoslavia and the Middle East, exceptionally from other parts of the world. This group represented about one third of the Division.

The second group included Czechoslovak citizens who were fighting in the civil war in Spain and who, after retreat to France, were interned here in concentration camps. These members of the Division - there were several hundreds of them - were warmly welcome in the Division because of their combat experience acquired in Spain. A problem in this group was the fact that they were influenced by the propaganda of the Communist International, which considered the Czechoslovak army in the West to be an imperialistic and bourgeois instrument. They considered the Second World War to be - according to Marxist-Leninist doctrines - a war of imperialists, and Britain and France to be responsible for its beginning. Joining the Czechoslovak troops abroad became a way out of social poverty and political insecurity for these people; they were not identified with the objectives of these troops and became a politicizing element oriented against activities of the Czechoslovak government in exile, or the Czechoslovak National Committee, and thus they operated against the unity of the Division and disturbed the combat morale.

The third group was represented by Czechoslovak citizens living abroad, who were mobilized in accordance with Czechoslovak laws. These were mainly Slovaks who - with the existence of the Slovak State - did not feel loyal to the former Czechoslovak Republic and refused to fulfil duties being in agreement with Czechoslovak legal standards. They were quite often brought by French policemen in handcuffs into the Division camp in Agde. And those who complied with the mobilization or were coming to serve in the army abroad without any internal convictions.

The above mentioned negative conditions represented by various groups of troops were intensified by bad weaponry and equipment, accommodation and material support of the men. Personal conflicts motivated politically, ethnically and also racially often emerged in the Division. The conflicts were frequently solved in an insensitive manner by field gendarmerie. In June 1940, the Division having all these internal complications was sent to the front actually collapsing at this time. Some parts of our Division had hardly stepped in the fights and were seized with chaos of events connected with the retreat of the French army and agreement on cease-fire between Germany and France. A real disintegration of the 1st Czechoslovak Division in France was the consequence. Subsequently, the defensive group of Czechoslovak military intelligence finished its activities too.



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

After the defeat of Poland and France, London became the only center of the Czechoslovak military resistance in the West. Great Britain acknowledged the Czechoslovak Exile Government on July 9, 1940. In the autumn 1940, exile Ministry of Defense headed by Division General Sergey Ingr was established. Colonel Moravec was authorized to head Department II - Intelligence Department - within the new hierarchy. The London Ministry of National Defense also commanded the Czechoslovak units in Middle East.

Department II had to direct intelligence activities in cooperation with other resorts and present reports of espionage character and drawn conclusions to the Minister of National Defense. Department II presented knowledge of intelligence character to the Chief of Staff of the Ministry of National Defense. The London intelligence workers also cooperated with Department I. Their task was to provide connection with people in the Protectorate territory. Authority of Department II came out from war situation and needs. Besides its traditional role within the offensive sphere and counter-intelligence, it also accepted new elements into its organization. This concerned tasks within the fight against invaders, especially preparation and committing of sabotages and diversionary actions in the Protectorate territory.

The need to carry out these actions, which may seem unusual from the point of military intelligence work of that time, followed from the status of the Czechoslovak exile political representation in London in particular. The British Government regularly evaluated the domestic resistance activities in occupied countries. The grade of assessment followed from the degree of damages to the German invaders caused by the resistance activities. After the Reichs Protector, Police and SS General Reinhard Heydrich had arrived in Prague, he started to organize repression against the Czech Protectorate resistance. In the second half of 1941, the Czech most efficient resistance organization Obrana národa (Defense of the Nation) was decimated. And so, results of the Czech resistance subsequently reached the end of the London assessment. This fact really pressed on President Beneš, and decreased his political room for maneuver towards the allies as well as towards the internal political representation, although the exile representation only. In this period of time, it was impossible for the domestic Protectorate resistance to increase resistance activities in response to messages sent from the London central office. This is why the British exile intensified dispatching of parachutists aimed at diversionary actions in the Protectorate. President Beneš supposed that such actions, which would be sufficiently symbolic and demonstrative, would encourage national activities and help form a mass resistance. Two persons who should have become the targets of the parachute unit were discussed. One of them was the member of the Protectorate Government and former Czechoslovak officer Emanuel Moravec, the other was Heydrich himself. In the end, it was decided to attack on the Acting Reichs Protector Heydrich. This action is known under the cover name Anthropoid.

According to the significance of the aim of the Anthropoid operation, its preparation was guarded as watchfully as possible and even more thoroughly than the other parachute unit actions. From the intelligence staff, Colonel Moravec, his deputy, Colonel Strankmüller, and Staff Captain Fryč participated in this operation. President Beneš was not informed about technical details of this operation. Nevertheless, he personally met chosen soldiers before their departure.

Operation Anthropoid is one of the most controversial actions of the intelligence Department of the London Exile Ministry of Defense, because of the impact that the attack on Heydrich had for the Czech nation, which was subsequently in the center of Nazi repression of an unusual scale. It is proved that Heydrich was not replaced by any



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

comparable person then, and his death had a damaging effect on German war efforts. President Beneš himself assessed the significance of this assassination from the international political point of view as immense. On the other hand, the Czech Protectorate resistance movement did not wake up, and the expectation of the exile Government that the German pressure will help the Czech back-pressure against Nazi bodies repression emerge did not come true. Thus, the value of this assassination is controversial, but this does not concern the military point of view. First of all, it concerns about 5,000 Czechs (including circa 3,000 Czech Jews) who died under the Nazi revenge. However, this is a different question, which gauges real and symbolic success of the Heydrichiade. From the point of view of activities of Czech intelligence workers in London, this action was positively well prepared. It concerns the period of planing, preparation as well as training without regard to betrayal that meant the end of the dispatched parachutists. Major Bartík who had returned from France headed the Defense Part of Department II. Its activities were particularly based on information of the 2-nd Section of the 1-st Czechoslovak Independent Brigade Staff and on its own agency which was formed outside the military organization. This body resided in the Ministry of National Defense building in London at 131 Piccadilly Street. Forms and methods of the activities of the counterintelligence were determined by demand for intelligence protection of the Czechoslovak troops, national reliability, military secret protection, and protection against hostile secret services. Apart from the own agency, it had a unit of field gendarmery at its disposal, and closely cooperated with the British MI-6 intelligence and MI-5 counter-intelligence, which was a natural subsequence of its location in the Great Britain territory.

And similarly as in France, foreign secret services did not endanger Czechoslovak units in Britain as significantly as internal discrepancies that lasted since their activities in France. Many problems occurred in discipline, or even criminal sphere. No army, even a volunteer army, is immune to such problems. These problems were joined by nationality, political, and racial problems, which are more dangerous and can have a destructive effect in the end. Situation worsened due to permanent failures in warfare, uncertainty, and permanent retreat. This dispiriting influence also deepened thanks to the outside propaganda. Decrease of discipline, integrity, and combat capability were the results of this depression. This happened on the international political background in which it was on the contrary necessary to present the Czechoslovak Republic before its allies as well as domestic population in the Protectorate as an illustrious representative of a nation and effective member of the anti-Hitler coalition.

And similarly as in France, the Czechoslovak army in Britain and Middle East was endangered by communist propaganda first of all. At the eastern front in the USSR, it resulted in so-called "Hvězdáři" movement that also spread into Middle East and Britain and caused revolt of 560 soldiers and officers in Cholmondeley camp after retreat from France. Problems in this area arose from the instructions of the Communist International, which the Czechoslovak communists followed till the attack on the Soviet Union and its entrance into the war. They acknowledged neither the Czechoslovak exile Government headed by Dr. Beneš, nor the army that he commanded. Due to their standpoints, they subverted resistance movement abroad. According to their point of view, the exile resistance was in the imperialistic service, and the western imperialism was labeled as aggressor. The central office of the CPC abroad explained the situation to the domestic management in Prague. According to them, there was proletariat of the whole world, including German proletariat, on one side, and imperialistic powers on the other side. And they did not make any differences between Britain and France, or Germany and Italy. In telegram from Moscow of March 10, 1940, the standpoint of the CPC management was formed absolutely clear: "We radically refuse establishment of the Czechoslovak army abroad...". From the objective point of view, this meant a betrayal of



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Czechoslovak national interests in favor of communist internationalism idea, although the situation called for mobilization and unification of all powers aimed at the fight for the Czechoslovak statehood restoration at that time being. On the basis of this, Colonel Moravec saw the main risk for army unity in activities of communists, and formed his standpoints concerning the CPC policy in directive for the military counter-intelligence. He also informed domestic resistance management in the Protectorate about his standpoints concerning the activities of communists.

The military counterintelligence, however, systematically monitored not only the communists, but also the German emigration in Britain and centrifugal streams within the Czechoslovak emigration. Their interest was focused on everything that was left or right from the official policies of the Czechoslovak Government and President. Not only the military intelligence, but also the Ministry of Interior of the Exile Government, where, after fundamental discrepancies with Colonel Moravec, Major Bartík together with Major Sláma went over to, participated in these activities. Intelligence officers of particular units performed activities of counter-intelligence character at Czechoslovak units. The counter-intelligence also took part in selection of parachutists for special tasks in the Protectorate, including above-mentioned attack on Acting Reichs Protector Heydrich.

According to conditions and situation, the military intelligence oscillated in supporting of particular elements of the resistance movement in the West between successes and failures. This situation can be demonstrated in activities of the counter-intelligence in Turkish Istanbul, which became, thanks to the interim neutrality of Turkey, a haunt for intelligence services and a similar intelligence information market like Portuguese Lisbon.

Our intelligence central office in Istanbul operated within the Czechoslovak military mission headed by Colonel of the General Staff Heliodor Píka at first, and after his leaving for Moscow in April 1941 by former military attaché to Warsaw, Colonel of the General Staff Prokop Kumpošt. In March 1942, former expert of the Hungarian section of the planning and study group of the 2-nd department of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army, Lieutenant Colonel of the General Staff Jaroslav Hájíček took over management of the local intelligence central office. Members of the Czech colony that lived there in amount of about 130 people were used for intelligence purposes. Thanks to them, the counterintelligence was able to conduct misinformation operation against the German military intelligence service. Via this operation based on foisting of person of Czech origin, the German service was supplied by fake information concerning activities of double agents. The information concerned agents who were really working for the German side only. However, thanks to this operation, they became unreliable and discredited for Germans. Vice versa, the German intelligence service was supplied by information concerning people who were of special significance for the Czech resistance movement. However, these people were labeled as persons of the "black list" containing traitors and quislings of the Czech resistance movement. Slipping of cipher keys allegedly used by the Czechoslovak side represented another operation. Via these keys, reliability of other foisted people, including a person who was later on controlled by the British service with aim to reveal the German spy net in Palestine, was being confirmed.

Opposite the intelligence successes is a case of infiltration of the German agent, Second Lieutenant of the Czechoslovak Army Vasil Roznijčuk into the Czechoslovak service. He came from Carpathian Ukraine and he enlisted in our army in Near East. He managed to work as efficiently within the structure of the Istanbul central office that Colonel Kumpošt chose him for the cryptographer position. Roznijčuk handed the real cipher key over to the German service, and he also delivered a range of reports that he had elaborated himself. After the London counterintelligence had revealed him as a German agent, he



managed to escape to Bulgaria, where he worked at the headquarters of the German labor service in Sofia.

Under Conditions of Domestic Protectorate Resistance

It is obvious that offices of the Third Reich created excellent conditions for Nazi state-security sector activities in the area of Bohemia and Moravia through the protectorate direction. Therefore any resistance activity was more difficult and conducting the intelligence defense of all organization groups and activities of the domestic resistance was more valuable. Further increase of defense intelligence importance came after the beginning of sabotage and diversionary activities in the area of Protectorate and dropping Czechoslovak parachutists in our territory.

One of the first, who took place in organization of resistance, were members of former Czechoslovak Army and professional intelligence, of course. As a result, illegal military resistance organizations in the whole protectorate, later called the Nation Defense, occurred. Basic networks were created and hierarchically divided municipal, country and local headquarters of the resistance organization were established till summer 1939. Military and political intelligence was the priority of the Nation Defense, where the aim was an armed opposition of the Czech nation to the occupying power.

Especially legionaries and senior officers from Prague and Brno established the Nation Defense. The commanders of this Czechoslovak underground army in the period of Nazi occupation were General Josef Bílý and his deputy Hugo Vojta, who was a connection to leaders of Sokol, since August 1939. Lieutenant Colonel Adler had responsibility for radio network control. Financial security was trusted to General Spěváček, who had secret sources of the Ministry of National Defense and Czech arms industry at his disposal. An outstanding person of the Nation Defense was also a Protectorate Prime Minister Divisional General Alois Eliáš. Also exile center in London, including intelligence intended for securing connection and this resistance organization, passed a comment to appointing the main representatives of the Nation Defense.

Within mentioned structures, the commander of the Defense Intelligence in conditions of the Nation Defense was a member of the defense section in the 2nd Department of the Main Staff of the Czechoslovak Army infantry Major František Hieke. He focused his activities at monitoring the activities of former Czech German-oriented political leaders, and also downright traitors as former colonel of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak Army Emanuel Moravec. Hieke tried through his activities to infiltrate to the organizations of Czech fascists. From these, informers and agents provocateurs of the Gestapo and Nazi secret service were recruited. Through this activity, Heike was successful in being in contact with former major of the Czechoslovak Army, who was one of gallopers of the leader of Gajda fascist organization sited in Uhelny Trh in Prague. Hieke pretended an interest and sympathy to the fascist movement and he won this man and gained secret information on intentions of the Czech fascists, which were very important for the Czech resistance. Hieke's activity focused also on Czech national-socialist assembly, where the decisive word had the Flag (Vlajka). Hieke's person infiltrated into this organization. Major Hieke activated some agents of the old network of the 2nd Department of the Main Staff, which succeeded in getting to extreme right and fascist Czech political circles. An important agent of Hieke's network was former editor and secretary of National Newspapers (Národní Listy) Jošt. He, as a former member of the Gajda's National Fascist community, prominent relations and he provided Hieke with important intelligence



information. However, even other journalists provided the Czech resistance with information helping with activities security.

Former agents of the 2nd Department arranged Major Hieke meetings with Czech police officials, who came during official activities to contact with occupation apparatus. Since autumn 1939, Hieke gained so high-quality information from the Prague Gestapo, that the Resistance was able to gain information on some arresting in advance and react to secure its members. Hieke allegedly gained information on contents of index cards from the register of Gestapo. This connection was then used to gain data of defense character by successors of the first set in the leadership of the Nation Defense, Colonel Balabán, Lieutenant Colonel Mašín and Staff Captain Morávek.

Even people from intelligence network of former members of search section of the 2nd Department Infantry Major František Fárka and Staff Captain Antonín Long tried to infiltrate in Prague Gestapo offices. Although many Czech policemen in Gestapo refused to cooperate with the Czech intelligence, there were some men providing actual information regularly even once a week. One of these officials provided Czech resistance fighters with information on interrogation and behavior of persons arrested by Gestapo. That significantly contributed to conducting the defense measures to cover the resistance's activities and saving its people. The same purpose had activities of regional and local headquarters of the Nation Defense, which gained sources among police officers in individual regions, as in Brno and Ostrava.

Defense intelligence of the Nation defense dealt with infiltration of resistance movement not only at home, but also gained information about agents of nazi services with the tasks to get to the environment of Czech immigration abroad. To cover the activities of these agents, the German offices used blank passports from the Ostrava police office. Staffer that these passports issued, was a collaborator of our defense intelligence and he provided them with secret numbers of the passports marked with watermark at uneven page. There were approximately one hundred passports and according to the activity of defense intelligence, a number of German agents were arrested in Poland by local counterintelligence informed by our service. This was before September 1939, when Czech emigrants used border with Poland to escape from Protectorate.

Not only organizations formed of former army officers that were the largest and most efficient, because there were intelligence officers used to work in the hierarchy and with respect to conspiracy rules, were engaged in resistance intelligence. However, Nazi sections, especially Gestapo, were many times were successful in penetration the Nation Defense, which resulted in liquidation of many members, including "the first garniture".

In the Protectorate operated also other resistance organizations, which were not formed of army officers and their intelligence work was focused more on political, social and economical fields. Organization called Political Headquarters was created from the political circle close to President Beneš. The organization worked on conception of before the Munich Pact of 1938 coalition of five political parties brought to underground/illegality. One of its most important tasks was to keep connection with emigrants in London, especially with Dr. Beneš. Political intelligence information was to the fore of interests of even other resistance movement, which was formed on quite wide basis and politically and ideologically focused on leftish policy. Roots of this resistance center called the Věrní zůstaneme (We remain faithful) Petitionary Committee were before Munich Pact of 1938 in operations of the Věrní zůstaneme (We remain faithful) Petitionary Committee in September 1938 and in the period of the second republic.



Activities of the Committee were characterized by Writers' manifesto Věrní zůstaneme and movement cooperated with Communists in above-mentioned period. Intelligence security of these and other resistance movements and organizations was focused especially on defense of its own activities, in the process the experience in the area could be used often by communist groups familiar with methods of conspiracy works.

Military Intelligence after the Second World War

From the point of view of the existing political system, the period of 1945 - 1948, which was decisive for further political orientation of the liberated Czechoslovakia, is considered to be a democratic period. The Parliamentary elections of May 1946 are assessed similarly, as well. Some materials, usually from activities of the then intelligence services, declassified after 1989 can arouse different assessment of political situation of other people. It concerns in particular the influence of the Interior Ministry upon the Communist seizure of political power in the country. This period is also significant for the Military Defense Intelligence because, in this exact period, the basis was established for further use of the military counter-intelligence capabilities in favor of the totalitarian power till early 1990.

Four intelligence services were operating in Czechoslovakia in this period - Military Counter- Intelligence (OBZ), Military Intelligence Service (The 2nd Section of the Defense Ministry), Security Divisions of the Historical Countries II (ZOB II) and State Security (StB). By means of their activities, these intelligence services took part in fulfilling a wide-range spectrum of different tasks concerning the efforts to reconstruct economy - devastated by the war - as well as public life, and to build-up armed forces, security bodies etc. The activities of these services were aimed at fight against the rest of the Nazi underground, protection of the border area, purge of the public life from collaborators and traitors, purge of the officers and warrant officers army personnel and revealing war criminals who had come to our territory from abroad.

The intelligence services of that time themselves did not determine the political development in the republic, but the political party which had gained the decision-making influence upon them, the Communist Party at that time, disposed of information not available for other parties within the political fight. Gaining control of the Interior Ministry was a key to such an information. Nowadays, we know that Military Counter-Intelligence headed by Bedřich Reicin played the decisive role in the grasp of the Interior Ministry by the Communist Party. The historical context of Military Counter-Intelligence establishment and its activities in the first half of 1945 indicate why exactly this security body gained a privileged position in comparison with other members of the intelligence community, and, at the same time, why it was necessary to separate this counter-intelligence component from the activities of the military offensive intelligence.

The separation of Military Counter-Intelligence (OBZ) officially was set on the basis of the January 7, 1945 order of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps Commander in the USSR General Ludvík Svoboda. The First Lieutenant Reservist of that time, Bedřich Reicin became the chief of this body. The Commander of the Army Corps has established this department at a direct request of a military council member of the 4th Ukrainian Front General Mechlis. The OBZ establishment became an important part of the Soviet leadership effort to create conditions for exerting influence within development in the army and also within other spheres of life in the liberated Czechoslovakia. Up to that time, First Lieutenant Reservist Reicin worked as a public education officer and together with Major LLD Jaroslav Procházka controlled activities of non public Communist Party



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Organization and he edited "Our Troops in the USSR" magazine. Reicin as well as his Deputy, First Lieutenant LLD Karel Vaš graduated from Soviet intelligence schools. According to some sources, First Lieutenant Vaš was a NKVD officer and he was assigned by its leadership to work in the Czechoslovak Military Counter-Intelligence after the war. The Soviet NKVD assigned other officers who came from Volyně or Carpathian Ruthenia regions with the same tasks. In the course of the following period, they continuously informed the Soviet intelligence service about the situation in the Czechoslovak army and society. The OBZ had to form a kind of weight against the 2nd Section of the London-located National Defense Ministry headed by General František Moravec, who was not popular inside the Soviet Union. The Soviets did not trust him on the basis of relations between Moravec and the resident of the Soviet intelligence service in London Colonel Tchitchayev.

The time of the OBZ establishment was not accidental either. The decision about establishment of secret service of any type is in responsibility of Government and Parliament in any country. At the Soviets' request, General Ludvík Svoboda decided to establish the OBZ without an approval of the Defense Ministry, Government and President of Republic in the period when the above-mentioned institutions had completely lost any influence upon development of the situation connected with the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps in the USSR. At that time, the Government and the Defense Ministry only noticed and possibly additionally approved decisions of the Corps Commander. Formally, it was only splitting of the offensive intelligence and defensive intelligence. Nevertheless, a completely independent intelligence service disposing of wide-ranging powers was established in fact.

The organizational structure and also techniques of Military Counter-Intelligence followed from directives valid in the Red Army. This newly established intelligence service diametrically differed from the existing Military Intelligence Service in the organizational structure, techniques of work and in the acquired powers. Besides information sections there were also efficient executive authorities in the established Military Counter-Intelligence. The OBZ formed the so-called "security troops" which carried out detaining and arresting of persons, house searches, escorting and guarding of the arrested persons and other executive tasks. Members of the above-mentioned security troops enjoyed almost unlimited powers not only towards military persons but also towards civilians on the liberated territory. In addition to intelligence activities, they substituted activities of the field gendarmery in fact. The military assistance troops and guards of the National Security were also subordinated to Military Counter-Intelligence since liberation in the border area up to the end of military alert in the country. The OBZ sections were gradually formed inside particular brigades of the Army Corps within build-up of the organizational and cadre system for counter-intelligence activities. Their members were checking persons, searching for deserters and they took part in arresting and escorting collaborators and traitors. They were searching for the German army and the occupation bodies' archives. The OBZ members were overwhelmingly recruited from officers of the public education and information service of the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps in the USSR. Since the beginning of its existence, the public education and information service of the Corps became a domain of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and it carried out its activities in close cooperation with similar institutions in the Red Army. One part of the Corps soldiers even identified the public education and information service with the OBZ. The OBZ members closely cooperated with Soviet intelligence bodies. Before the OBZ establishment, Reicin with his coworkers in the USSR and with the London-located Communists took part in checking the Czechoslovak officers who had been re-deployed from Britain to our troops in the USSR during the war. On the basis of their information, many of them were not granted the USSR entry visa. Since the very beginning of the



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

OBZ existence inside the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps in the USSR, its members aimed interest of intelligence character at the officers coming to the Corps from the West. Many of them openly expressed not very positive opinions concerning the level of command and control, material equipment, and proficiency of soldiers who were committed to action by the Corps' command. This situation resulted in objections of the OBZ department of the 1st Army Corps in the USSR against their promotions and appointments to various posts. The main OBZ tasks in course of the war were as follows: checking officers and warrant officers who joined the 1st Czechoslovak Army Corps in the USSR on the basis of the mobilization order on the liberated territory, searching for documents of the occupation authorities and other institutions the content of which made it possible to identify collaborators and traitors and to clear up their activities during the occupation or the existence of the Slovak Republic. OBZ paid a special attention to the archives of the Gestapo, police and other institutions which took their decisive part in suppressions of people in course of the war. The OBZ members detained and arrested collaborators and traitors not only from the ranks of the army members, but also from other armed bodies and from significant representatives of political and public life. They also participated in their investigations. The important OBZ tasks also included discovering secret Nazi organizations operating illegally on the territory of the republic after its liberation. From the very beginning, Military Counter-Intelligence represented an important source of information for the Soviets and for the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia as well. Bedřich Reicin engaged personally in preparing the communists for the Moscow negotiations about the platform and structure of the new government. In his letter to Klement Gottwald of March 6, 1945, he recommended to appoint General Ludvík Svoboda to the post of the Defense Minister at any price and to entrust General Boček with the post of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. In spite of the fact that the Košice Government Program dealt with all substantial matters of the social life in the liberated republic it does not include any passage concerning the activities of the Interior Ministry and the security system. We cannot reliably find out any reason for it. The Communist Party of Czechoslovakia chose the way of gaining the post of the Interior Minister and subsequently to enforce the necessary changes. It is proved by the change of candidate for the Interior Minister office as well. Rudolf Slánský was the first candidate, but, later on, Václav Nosek who was more acceptable for other partners when negotiating replaced him; he had worked in Britain during the war. In course of the Moscow talks, the negotiations about the Interior Minister post did not become an object of disputes between the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and the representatives of other political parties.

After approving the Košice government program and establishment of the new government, the OBZ positions were further strengthened by forming the OBZ Main Administration inside the Defense Ministry. Captain Bedřich Reicin was appointed its Chief at the suggestion of General Svoboda. At the same time, General Svoboda initiated removal of the leading officials of the Czechoslovak Military Resistance in the West from the significant posts in the army. It especially concerned General Ingr and General Moravec in Military Intelligence. The Military Council at the Presidium of the Government decided that all officers and warrant officers joining the army after the war would be checked. The OBZ officer was a member of each checking commission. Reicin himself became a member of the Defense Ministry commission that checked generals and officers of the General Staff. Thus the OBZ influence within the army was gradually increasing with respect to its authorities when assessing national and state reliability and credibility of generals, officers and warrant officers and participation in the purge of the officer and warrant officer army personnel. The OBZ kept personal documents on all servicemen and the relevant OBZ level enabled promotions and appointments of officers to higher posts.



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

Except special cases, the final decision was based on the OBZ viewpoint, even when decisions belonged to the Government or to the President of Republic.

Up to the liberation, the OBZ fulfilled tasks relating usually to the army. The issues connected with work of the Interior Ministry and its security bodies were discussed at the Government Presidium session on April 12, 1945, and subsequently also by the whole government on April 17, 1945. According to the suggestion of the Interior Minister Nosek, the government approved material "The Main Principles of the New Security System Build-Up". This document included also the government decision to abolish the old security corps and replace them by the new security system. At the same time, the government resolution supposed that in course of build-up of the new security bodies the members of the Czechoslovak Army Corps and the internal resistance movement participants would be recruited preferentially. On May 15, 1945, Václav Nosek officially took over office of the Interior Minister. At the same time, he also took over office of Chairman of the Government Personnel Commission, which was dealing with assigning important posts within all ministries. His main effort was oriented towards implementing tasks included in the document "The Main Principles of the New Security System Build-Up". Taking into account this meaning, the government resolution left a wide-range scope for spreading the OBZ influence outside the army and mediately also for deepening the Czechoslovak Communist Party influence inside the Interior Ministry. On the basis of the Interior Minister decree, the key posts in the newly built-up security bodies were gradually filled by the army officers on active duty or by reserve officers, mostly the members of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The OBZ took part in their selection and checking. Owing to the fact that the OBZ was keeping personal documents on all officers it was accurately informed about all officers who had gone over to the Interior Ministry. They were often keeping wide-range contacts with them and using them for building-up nets of the OBZ agents inside the SNB (the Corps of the National Security), StB (the State Security) and even also inside the ZOB II (see above - Security Divisions of the Historical Countries). In the cited way, the Interior Ministry, in cooperation with the Defense Ministry, filled also the following commander positions - in the National Security Emergency Regiment that was militarily organized, in the Interior Ministry department of the political newscast, in the main headquarters of the National Security Corps (SNB), in its headquarters of the Czechoslovak historical countries and also in ZOB (see above) later on, and in the State Security). For example, in summer 1945, the Defense Ministry permanently transferred for service in the National Security Emergency Regiment 24 officers and 2 warrant officers, in the historical country's SNB headquarters in Bohemia 13 officers and 2 warrant officers, and from the army intelligence brigade for service in the Interior Ministry 7 officers. When solving personal issues in security bodies of the Interior Ministry, Nosek closely cooperated with the Chief of the OBZ section of the Interior Ministry Political Newscast Department Captain Pokorný and with the OBZ Main Administration Chief Captain Reicin. Filling important posts at the Interior Ministry itself was discussed by the basic organization of the Czechoslovak Communist Party whose resolutions were binding for Minister Nosek. As early as in this period, the OBZ gained a privileged position inside the Czechoslovak intelligence and security community of that time, and it took a significant part not only in deepening the communist influence inside the Interior Ministry, but also inside other bodies of the state administration. The privileged position of the OBZ was being enhanced by a firm and working organizational structure, by access to the Gestapo and Protectorate administration archives and documents, to interrogations of collaborators and traitors, to various results of activities and to members of the operatives' networks. The OBZ influence was also determined by its close cooperation with the Soviet security bodies and by infiltration into other security bodies, into the system of the Interior Ministry first of all.



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

To sum up this period, we can say that Military Counter-Intelligence stabilized itself relatively fast after its establishment in 1945. At the beginning of 1946, the OBZ Main Administration was renamed and integrated into the main staff of the Czechoslovak army as its 5th Section. The OBZ organization stabilized itself relatively fast and it remained more or less unchanged up to the establishment of the Military Intelligence Service Headquarters in 1951. The OBZ significance for the ZOB II (see above) activities or for the activities of the State Security itself later on is not always duly appreciated. Even though, it was in many aspects the Military Defensive Intelligence, which represented an example for the established State Security that took over its cadres, methods as well as terminology. The basic division of the OBZ Main Administration before 1950 was as follows - the sections: organizational and personnel, operational (search), study (assessing), inquisitional, and legal, protection of industry (taken over by the State Security Headquarters in 1951), border protection (taken over by SNB - The National Security Corps in 1946); a lot of auxiliary bodies: the economic and technical group, signal platoon and staff (security) unit. The further renaming of Military Counter-Intelligence is related to the complete reorganization and re-dislocation of the Czechoslovak army as on August 15, 1950, the Main Information Administration was established. However, as early as on March 30, 1951, the independent Headquarters of the Military Intelligence Service was established but, nevertheless, as early as on April 1, 1951, it was subordinated to the National Security Minister. Thus, one of the demands arising from the 9th Communist Party Congress was accomplished. It concerned establishment of one security service that will, under conditions of the army as well, carry out tasks resulting from the consistent assertion of the proletariat dictatorship. By his order of May 1951, the National Security Minister detached the 4th Sector from the State Security Headquarters for the purpose of its uniting with Military Counter-Intelligence, and thus, the later "C" Department of the National Security Ministry was formed. Finally on May 29, 1952, the Military Intelligence Service Headquarters was renamed the Main Administration of Military Counter-Intelligence (HS VKR), but there was basically no change, but in its integration. No change was in its activities, either. Only after abolishment of the National Security Ministry, the HS VKR was united with the Interior Ministry as its 6th and, later on, 3rd Administration.

Military Counter-Intelligence was incorporated into the system of the Interior Ministry and thus this department gained a full control over all events in the republic. The Intelligence Administrative Unit of the General Staff (ZS/GŠ) of the Czechoslovak People's Army (ČSLA), that is to say Military Espionage, was the only intelligence service which did not organizationally come under the Interior Ministry. Nevertheless, this independence was a mere fiction in fact as the bodies of the Main Administration (Administrative Unit) of Military Counter-Intelligence incorporated in the Interior Ministry system as the 6th Administration (Administrative Unit) were authorized to the intelligence protection of the ZS/GŠ. Thus the VKR was building-up an agency inside the ZS/GŠ structures as well, and in relation to the external Czechoslovak workplaces abroad first of all. At the same time, it also took part in checking persons appointed to the positions inside the ZS/GŠ.

On the other hand, it is not advisable to be under the illusion that the ZS/GŠ ČSLA, even though the only body standing outside the system of the Interior Ministry, represented the body doing everything in accord with the political leaders of the state. In the case of the ZS/GŠ, this fact was further enhanced by its position of the intelligence body of the army of the Warsaw Pact member state. The ZS/GŠ was consequently much more dependent on the Soviet hegemonic leader, and a great number of intelligence operations carried out by this component of the General Staff of the Czechoslovak



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

People's Army was not implemented only with the support of the Soviet intelligence bodies, but also directly in favor of them.

The significance of Military Counter-Intelligence rapidly increased after the defection (that is the defection of the Intelligence Service cadre officer to the enemy service) of the Military Attaché to Washington Major František Tišler, which happened on July 25, 1959. When investigating the defection of Tišler, Military Counter-Intelligence could prove that it had pointed out already in advance, in its reports for the ZS/GŠ leaders, at an array of suspicious matters as far as for the person of Tišler. Not only negative aspects whose assessment were typical in that time in the political sphere were in question, but also a lot of negative aspects in the field of the professional performance of the intelligence activities abroad.

The 1968 occupation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by the Warsaw Pact occupation forces also implied significant changes inside the power departments of defense and interior ministries. Many members of the security bodies emigrated to the West, some of them operated in the civil intelligence service (the 1st administrative unit of the Interior Ministry). The reorganization of the security and intelligence apparatus was not a mere professional reaction to these defections, but also a chance of coming to grips with the representatives of the so-called "rightist center" inside these bodies and to install persons loyal to Moscow in the decisive posts. The Army Defensive Intelligence (Military Counter-Intelligence) was then incorporated into the structure of the Federal Interior Ministry within the newly established Federal Administration of the Intelligence Services (FS - ZS) as the 3rd Administrative Unit of the FS - ZS - The Main Administration of Military Counter-Intelligence. Later on, it was incorporated as the 3rd Administrative Unit of the Main SNB Administration (SNB = The Corps of the National Security) - The Main Administration of Military Counter-Intelligence - so it operated like up to the events of November 1989.

The VKR goals and activity continuously followed in the OBZ after 1945. The VKR (Military Counter-Intelligence) was a consolidated component of the state security system in the totalitarian country of that time, and it represented a pillar supporting state power inside one of the most significant spheres - the Armed Forces as a part of the Warsaw Pact. That is why, a great number of problems connected with organization and activities of the 3rd Administrative Unit of the SNB Main Administration - VKR (Military Counter-Intelligence) will surely represent a subject of investigations of historians and members of the Office of Documentation and Investigation of Communist Crimes at the Czech Republic Interior Ministry in future.

Military Intelligence after 1990

Both parts of the Military Intelligence, separated in the period of the Communist Czechoslovakia, existed independently from 1990 up to passing the 1994 Act on intelligence services.

The most significant problem existing in the sphere of the state security bodies of domestic authority after November 1989 was obviously represented by the effort to prevent from abusing power of these bodies against the citizens. For these reasons, the No. 67 Act on Military Counter-Intelligence was passed in 1992. One of its parts is represented by an amendment of the parliamentary control of activities of this domestic security intelligence service, which carries out its tasks in the sphere of defense.



MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

The constitution of the No.153/1994 Sb. (Code of Law) Act on Intelligence Services of the Czech Republic was a decisive step defining the existence of intelligence services. By means of the provisions of this standard, the repeated merging of the military offensive and defensive intelligence services into one intelligence service took place. This intelligence service is represented by the Military Intelligence as one of three Intelligence Services of the Republic. By way of diction of this act, the united Military Intelligence was established; it consists of two parts - the Military Intelligence Service, that is to say the Military Intelligence, and the Military Defensive Intelligence, that is to say the Military Counter-Intelligence. Nevertheless, the legislator's intention did not come up to expectation during 1994 - 2003 in fact. However, the Military Intelligence was headed by one Director responsible to the Defense Minister, the Directors subordinate to him - Director of the Military Intelligence Service and Director of the Military Defensive Intelligence - were responsible to him from the methodical point of view and in the chain of command only. They were not subordinate to him in the sphere of professional (special) activities of the wholes they commanded and controlled. This absurd situation was enhanced by the fact that the Director of the Military Intelligence Service was professionally subordinate to the Chief of General Staff of the Army of the Czech Republic and on the contrary the Director of the Military Defensive Intelligence was professionally directly subordinate to the Defense Minister. This situation gave rise to an impression that there are four intelligence services in the Czech Republic. This impression has often come up not only among constitutional officials but also among the military and non-military public. The change of this dismal situation has been gradually taking place since 2003 when measures leading to the real implementing the wording of the law on the integrated Military Intelligence have been taken.

The new organizational structure of the Military Intelligence has been functioning since January 1, 2005. This one is to make effective use of possibilities of both its traditional constituents, that is to say intelligence agency and counter-intelligence service. The information outputs will be unified and these will represent the result of the coordination of both the constituents mentioned above.

By means of the character and aims of its activities, the current Military Intelligence does not look for any continuity with the past totalitarian military intelligence agency and military counter-intelligence service. It follows in the best traditions of military intelligence of the Czechoslovak Republic before 1945. All of this is done with the respect to traditional forms and methods of intelligence activities and their adaptation to the new security phenomena, first of all, to the asymmetric threats within the whole range of their forms.